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Abstract. This study examines the asymmetries in the tax-spending nexus for Burundi using 
a three-variable model. The study employs a threshold cointegration test with asymmetric 
adjustment advanced by Enders & Siklos (2001). The findings indicate that government 
spending, taxes and grants are cointegrated with asymmetric adjustment. Causality tests 
from the estimated asymmetric error correction model suggest that in the short run there is 
an independent relationship between government spending and taxes in Burundi. Pertaining 
to the impact of grants, the results show that grants encourage the government of Burundi 
to spend more, but, conversely, they also discourage tax revenue, which is known as the tax 
displacement hypothesis. The findings further show that only government spending 
responds to budgetary disequilibrium, and this occurs when the budget situation is 
worsening. This implies that in Burundi, to restore the equilibrium when the budget 
situation is worsening, the adjustment is made by reducing spending. A policy intuition 
arising from this study is that, to reduce budget deficits, Burundi should reduce its grant-
dependence and improve its tax collection system as well as cut its spending in sectors 
where it is not productive and reallocate it to more productive sectors.  
Keywords. Burundi, Spending, Taxes, Grants, Threshold cointegration, Asymmetric ECM. 
JEL. C32, E32, H20, H50, H62. 
 
1. Introduction 
urundi has experienced a number of episodes of civil war since its 
independence in 1962, which have affected the public finances of Burundi 
through increased military spending and reduced tax revenues due to the 
erosion of the tax base and tax administration capacity (Ndikumana, 2001; 
Nkurunziza, 2004). The 1993 civil war was the most devastating as it left the 
economic system paralyzed for more than a decade (1993-2005). The democratic 
elections of 2005 brought to an end a long period of political instability. The post-
conflict period saw several changes in the public finances of Burundi in a number 
of ways. At the spending level, government expenditure increased because of the 
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into the national security 
forces as well as the process of reconstruction which required an increase in 
recruitment in priority sectors such as health and education. The immediate 
consequence on the public finances of Burundi was a significant increase in the 
number of civil servants and current expenditure, especially expenditure on salaries. 
According to Debrun et al. (2011), between 2005 and 2010 the number of civil 
servants in Burundi increased by more than 50 percent and expenditure on salaries 
in real terms increased by 80 percent during the same period. On the revenue side, 
although some efforts were made to increase tax revenues by for instance creating 
the Burundi Revenue Authority and by replacing the transaction tax with VAT 
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(which occurred in 2009), the increase in tax revenue has not matched the increase 
in spending and the budget deficits remained high. For example, for the period 
2004-2012, the ratio of budget deficit to GDP averaged 5.8 percent and 21.6 
percent 1 , respectively, when including and excluding grants. This is too high 
compared to the convergence criterion2 concerning fiscal balance for EAC and 
COMESA to which Burundi belongs. Therefore, there is a need to reduce the 
budget deficit in Burundi, which can be done by either cutting government 
spending or increasing government taxes, or a combination of the two (Bohn, 
1991). However, choosing between these options is not an easy task because of the 
theoretical controversies in the literature surrounding the tax-spend nexus (tax-and-
spend hypothesis, spend-and-tax hypothesis, fiscal synchronization hypothesis, 
institutional separation hypothesis)3 (see Musgrave, 1966; Buchanan & Wagner, 
1977; Friedman, 1978; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Barro, 1986; Baghestani & 
McNown, 1994). Empirical analysis is therefore needed to understand the true 
relationship between them. 
 Until recently, the analysis of the tax-spending nexus was done under the 
assumption that taxes and spending respond symmetrically to budgetary 
disequilibrium. However, Ewing et al. (2006) point out that assuming symmetric 
adjustment of taxes and spending when it is actually asymmetric, would lead to 
misspecification, leading to false conclusions regarding the causal links between 
taxes and spending, hence inappropriate fiscal policy decisions. Ewing et al. (2006) 
give reasons as to why one should expect asymmetries in the budgetary adjustment 
process. First, they believe that policy makers do not respond in the same way to a 
budget surplus as they do to a budget deficit, and would respond more aggressively 
to a deficit than to a surplus. Second, they argue that budget and business cycle are 
closely related through automatic fiscal stabilizers and discretionary fiscal 
measures. Therefore, to the extent that the business cycle is asymmetric, the 
associated change in the budget may also be asymmetric. Third, they also argue 
that the way tax payers respond to the change in the tax rate or tax base may 
produce asymmetric variations in the budget.Very few studies so far have 
examined asymmetries in the tax-spending nexus (see Saunoris & Payne, 2010; 
Apergis et al., 2012; Keho, 2013). In addition, while there are many empirical 
studies on the tax-spending nexus of developing countries (see, for example, 
Narayan & Narayan, 2007; Sobhee, 2004; Keho, 2010; Aregbeyen & Taofik, 2012; 
Rethabile & Sephooko, 2012; Mehrara & Pahlavani, 2011; Keho, 2013), it is 
important to note that they often omit a key element in the analysis, which is 
grants 4 . It is common knowledge that most developing economies are grant-
dependent; for instance in Burundi grants alone accounted for 36.4 percent, 44.5 
percent and 34.6 percent of total revenue and grants, respectively, in 2006, 2007 
and 2008, and for 30.1 percent for the period 2006–2012.5 Ignoring grants in 
examining the tax-spending nexus would therefore be misleading since in grant-
dependent economies, grants are likely to affect domestic fiscal behaviour. 
 This study analyzes asymmetries in the tax-spending nexus in Burundi by 
taking into account external grants. The causal relationship between government 
taxes and government spending in Burundi is examined. In regard to this, should 
Burundi balance its budget through tax increases or spending cuts, or both? 
Moreover, we examine how external grants affect government spending and tax 
revenue in Burundi. Furthermore, the study seeks to establish whether taxes and 
spending respond to the budgetary disequilibrium in Burundi; and if they do, does 
the adjustment occur when the budget situation improves as well as when it 
worsens? These are the critical questions addressed by the study. The novelty of 
this study is that the causality between taxes and spending is tested in a framework 
that allows for asymmetries in the adjustment of taxes and spending to the 
budgetary disequilibrium. In addition, in examining the tax-spending nexus, the 
study takes into account external grants that are more important in the public 
finances of most sub-Saharan countries.  
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the stylized 
facts. Section 3 presents the methodology used. Section 4 presents and discusses 
the results and section 5 gives the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Government Spending, Tax Revenue and External Grants in 
Burundi: Stylized Facts 
2.1. Structure of Government Spending and Revenue in Burundi: Some 
Trends 
Table A.1 in the appendix shows the structure of government spending in 
Burundi for the period 2006-2012. It indicates that current expenditure on average 
accounted for about 75 percent of total government spending and capital 
expenditure for 25 percent for the period under consideration, suggesting that the 
government of Burundi spends more on recurrent expenses and less on 
investments. Expenditure on goods and services accounted for 50.8 percent of total 
government spending of which salaries alone accounted for 32.9 percent, indicating 
that a big part of recurrent spending is on salaries. Important to note also is the fact 
that government expenses on salaries have increased significantly over the period 
2006-2012. Expenses on salaries increased by 24.4 percent in 2007, 38.9 percent in 
2008, 22.8 percent in 2010, 23.6 percent in 2011 and from 2006 to 2012, they 
increased by 214.3 percent. The increase in the wage bill can be attributed to some 
events which occurred during that period, including the creation of the national 
police in 2006 after the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into 
the national security forces, which led to an increase in the number of civil 
servants. There were also recruitments in priority sectors such as health and 
education to support the process of reconstruction, which further increased the 
number of civil servants. Increase in government expenses on salaries was also due 
to the decision of the president to increase salaries of all civil servants by 15 
percent in July 2006 and by 34 percent at the end of 2007. The decomposition of 
spending further shows that transfers and subsidies account for 17.0 percent, 
interest payments account for 5.4 percent and special fund expenditure accounts 
for1.6 percent of the total government expenditures. 
Table A.2 in the appendix shows the structure of government revenues in 
Burundi for the period 2006-2012. It indicates that on average, out of the total 
government revenue and grants, tax revenues accounted for 65.7 percent, non-tax 
revenues accounted for 5.2 percent and grants accounted for 30.1 percent and, the 
ratio of grants in total government revenues is at 45.3 percent. This suggests that 
grants play an important role in the public finance of Burundi. The table also shows 
that a bulk of the tax revenues come from domestic trade with a share of 52.42 
percent, followed by income tax with a share of 29.16 percent, tax on international 
trade with a share of 12.30 percent and other tax revenues with a share of 6.11 
percent. In 2009, there was creation of the Burundi Revenue Authority “Office 
Burundais des Recettes”, a move that seems to have had a positive impact on tax 
collection. While across the period 2006-2009, the ratio of tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP was on average 12.8 percent, it increased to 14.6 percent for the 
period 2010-2012. It is to be noted that the ratio of grants to GDP fluctuated during 
the period 2006-2012. While it stood at 8.2 percent (percentage of GDP) in 2006, it 
increased to 11.3 percent in 2007 and fell to 7.2 percent in 2008 and fell further to 
2.9 percent in 2009 and was at 4.5 percent in 2012. The trend in grants is discussed 
in detail in the next subsection.  
 
2.2. Trend in External Grants in Burundi: Understanding the Donor 
Behavior 
Table 1 shows the trend in total grants (in real terms) in Burundi and their 
decomposition between current and capital grants for the period 1992-2012. Total 
grants varied year after year with some periods experiencing an increase in grants 
and others a decrease. Some years such as 1995, 1996 and 2009 experienced sharp 
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falls where grants fell respectively by 56.3 percent, 60.5 percent and 58.1 percent; 
for some other years, a remarkable increase is observed, 38.9 percent in 1993, 
148.9 percent in 2001, 54 percent in 2004 and 95.4 percent in 2010. Concerning the 
decomposition, on average for the period 1992-2012, current grants accounted for 
56.3 percent and capital grants, 43.7 percent of the total grants, implying that a big 
portion of grants was intended for the budgetary support. It is to be noted however 
that capital grants were of 77.5 percent in 1994, 62.1 percent in 2002 and 64.0 
percent in 2003 where a big portion of grants were directed at supporting the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure destroyed by the war. 
According to Nath & Sobhee (2007), foreign grants are determined by the donor 
self-interest and the recipient country’s needs. They also argue that donors may 
also respond to fungibility, the extent to which the grants are used as intended, i.e. 
to designated projects, behavior known as, “recipient fungibility behavior”.  In this 
regard, fungibility discourages donors. In addition, as Alesina & Dollar (2000) 
point out, factors determining aid (grant)-giving vary from donor to donor. For 
some, poverty levels, political and economic regimes do not matter a lot; provided 
it is a former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer, it does not matter 
whether the recipient country is inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged and 
non-democratic, grants will surely flow. For other donors, good institutions, 
political openness (democratization), good governance and respect for human 
rights, are key factors determining the flow of aid (grants). Donor behavior hence 
the flow of grants is therefore explained by the above mentioned factors which 
vary from country to country.  In this subsection, we dig in the recent political 
history of Burundi and try to explain the variation of external grants in Burundi. 
 
Table 1. Trend of Real Grants and their Decomposition (1992-2012) (in Millions of BIF, 
Constant 2005 Prices) 












1992 84089.51 - 38627.47 45.9 45462.04 54.1 
1993 116792 38.9 51782.69 44.3 65009.26 55.7 
1994 117617.9 0.7 26499.98 22.5 91117.95 77.5 
1995 51376.96 -56.3 25505.66 49.6 25871.30 50.4 
1996 20317.25 -60.5 10086.33 49.6 10230.92 50.4 
1997 21698.97 6.8 12836.63 59.2 8862.339 40.8 
1998 19670.63 -9.3 12772.78 64.9 6897.859 35.1 
1999 20625.57 4.9 12158.89 59.0 8466.68 41.0 
2000 23195.8 12.5 14017.89 60.4 9177.909 39.6 
2001 57726.47 148.9 21869.62 37.9 35856.84 62.1 
2002 85457.38 48.0 57634.51 67.4 27822.87 32.6 
2003 79931.29 -6.5 28806.29 36.0 51125.00 64.0 
2004 123059.7 54.0 81169.43 66.0 41890.24 34.0 
2005 103000 -16.3 79000.00 76.7 24000.00 23.3 
2006 101754.2 -1.2 69740.97 68.5 32013.24 31.5 
2007 145140.1 42.6 84856.20 58.5 60283.24 41.5 
2008 99467.84 -31.5 84698.54 85.2 14769.30 14.8 
2009 41638.68 -58.1 29908.04 71.8 11730.64 28.2 
2010 81377.07 95.4 41334.28 50.8 40042.79 49.2 
2011 114086.3 40.2 67629.35 59.3 46456.95 40.7 
2012 73298.13 -35.8 35329.34 48.2 37968.79 51.8 
Source: Author using data collected from various reports of Central Bank of Burundi. 
 
An initial observation of Table 1 indicates that there was an increase in grants of 
38.9 percent in 1993, a sharp decrease in 1995 and 1996 respectively of 56.3 
percent and 60.5 percent. The increase in grants in 1993 was probably due to 
support by the international community of the first democratic elections in Burundi 
and later on support of the first democratically elected government. Unfortunately, 
it did not last since the president was killed in a military coup a few months later, 
and a long civil war ensued and lasted up to 2005. The sharp fall in grants in 1995 
and 1996 can be explained by the political instability which was prevailing after 
the military coup of 1993. Moreover in July 1996, the situation was worsened by 
another military coup which was condemned by the international community and 
organizations such as United Nations (UN), Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
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etc. and sanctions in the form of an economic embargo were imposed on the 
country. As a consequence, Burundi received barely any external grant in the third 
and fourth quarter of 1996. The ruling regime of 1996 went up to 2000 when an 
agreement was reached in Arusha (Tanzania) for a transitional government. 
Noticeably, apart from 1997 where one sees a recovery in the flow of grants 
(increase of 6.8 percent), the flow of grants in 1997-1999 did not vary much and 
stabilized at around BIF 20 billion; for 1998, grants declined by 9.3 percent and 
increased by 4.9 percent in 1999. In fact, during this period, the main donors were 
NGOs and UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO and ICRC, since 
Burundi was under sanctions and aid had been suspended by the donor community. 
Grants resumed later in December 2000 after the Arusha Peace Process Agreement 
(Câmara & Ferreira, 2001). 
The agreement for the transitional government signed in 2000 resulted in a 
considerable amount of grants which were BIF 5474.8 million 6  higher than 
expected. Important to note is also that the transitional government which started 
from 2001 to 2005 was supported by the international community; the flow of real 
grants increased by 148.9 percent in 2001, 48.0 percent in 2002 and 54.0 percent in 
2004 in support of the peace process. Moreover, in 2001 there was a debt relief 
from China to Burundi, most of which was allocated to investments (capital 
grants)7 hence a huge increase of grants in 2001 of 148.9 percent. In 2003, while 
the transitional government needed money to implement the reforms of the Arusha 
Peace Agreements, donors were still anxious to see how things would go and were 
demanding a complete stop to violence and a progress in the implementation of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement which had been slow, in order to release the promised 
grants (Campbell, 2003). Was president Buyoya going to accept to hand over the 
presidency to Mr. Ndayizeye (who was the vice-president) as agreed? The 
international community kept wondering. Thus, in 2003, real grants decreased by 
6.5 percent. In addition, in 2003, there was a ceasefire agreement between the 
government of Burundi and the major rebel group, which ended the long period of 
civil war and revived the hope of political stability in Burundi. This was to be 
followed later by democratic elections in 2005 and 2010 from which successive 
governments emerged.  In 2010, real grants increased by 95.4 percent probably in 
support to the new elected government. And although in 2005 real grants fell by 
16.3 percent from 2004, compared to the expectations (BIF 82367.4 million), they 
increased by BIF 20632.6 million 8 . A decrease in the flow of grants can be 
observed in 2008, 2009 and 2012, respectively by 31.5 percent, 58.1 percent and 
35.8 percent. This has been largely due to massive human right violations, 
persecutions of political opponents, corruption and poor governance which the 
donors are not in agreement with. And in 2011, although, real grants increased by 
40.2 percent from 2010, compared to the expectations (grants promises of BIF 
469105.4 million ), the disbursement of grants was achieved only up 43.6 percent 9, 
this is as well attributable to the same reasons mentioned above. One expects also a 
low disbursement of grants and a sharp fall in grants even in 2013 for the same 
reasons mentioned above, reasons which have led the donors to freeze their grant 
promises. Hence, in Burundi, donors seem to respond to factors such as political 
stability, democratization, good governance and respect for human rights.  
 
3. Methodology 
 The objective of this paper is to analyze the nexus among government spending, 
taxes and grants and to examine the asymmetries in the budgetary adjustment 
process in Burundi. As shown in the next section, government spending, tax 
revenue and grants are non-stationary processes, integrated of order one. We can 
therefore test for cointegration between them since they are integrated of the same 
order. Instead of using a linear cointegration, which assumes symmetric 
adjustment, in TAR (Threshold Autoregressive) and M-TAR (Momentum 
Threshold Autoregressive) frameworks, this study employs the threshold 
cointegration test initiated by Enders & Granger (1998) and Enders & Siklos 
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(2001), a procedure which allows the examination of asymmetries in the budgetary 
adjustment process. Engle & Granger (1987) developed a test of linear 
cointegration, a residual-based test, and when the cointegrating relation exists 
between the variables, the Granger representation theorem says that the variables 
can be represented in the form of an error correction mechanism in which the 
variables can adjust towards the equilibrium when there is a deviation from it. 
However, the assumption made here is that the adjustment is symmetric and occurs 
instantaneously at each period which can be misleading because of the presence of 
fixed costs of adjustment 10  (Balke & Fomby, 1997). It is because of this 
shortcoming that Enders & Granger (1998) and Enders & Siklos (2001) developed 
the threshold cointegration, in which adjustment occurs only if the deviation is 
above some threshold, moreover the adjustment is asymmetric since negative and 
positive deviations are not corrected in the same way (Stigler, 2012). To test for 
cointegration, the Engle & Granger (1987) procedure involves checking whether 
the residual series from the long-run equation is stationary. Let
tG be real 
government spending,
tR , real government tax revenue and tGR , real grants. The 
long-run equilibrium relationship is written as follows11: 
 
(1)
t t t t
G R GR      
 
 In Equation 1, , and   are cointegrating coefficients and t are residuals that 




R GR . 
According to Engle & Granger (1987), testing for linear cointegration involves 
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where the number of lags (k) is chosen so that there is no serial correlation. If the 
null hypothesis of 0  is rejected, the residual series from the long-run equation is 




R  and 
t
GR ,are cointegrated. 
 According to Enders & Granger (1998), and Enders & Siklos (2001), using 
threshold autoregressive models, Threshold Autoregressive model (TAR) and 
Momentum Threshold Autoregressive model (M-TAR), Equation 2 can be 
rewritten as: 
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where is the threshold value to be estimated.  is estimated by considering only 
the middle 70% values of the threshold variable (which is
1t

 for the TAR model 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 







 for the M-TAR model), where TAR and M-TAR models are estimated 
using each of the 70% values and each being a potential threshold value. The 
optimum threshold value to be selected is the one which minimizes the residuals 
sum of squares (Sun, 2011). According to Ewing et al. (2006), Equation 4 (the 





) is above the threshold (  ), it is the positive phase of 










) is below the threshold ( ), it is 
the negative phase of budgetary disequilibrium (the worsening of the budget 




in this case. Thus, the TAR model captures 
how the budgetary disequilibrium responds to positive and negative deviations 
from the threshold. Under the TAR model, it is therefore possible to examine how 
government spending and taxes respond to the positive phase (surplus) and 
negative phase (deficit) of the budgetary disequilibrium. Contrary to the TAR 
model, the M-TAR model would enable us to examine the behaviour of 
government spending and taxes in response to positive and negative phases of 





While from TAR model one can examine how government taxes and spending 
respond to budgetary disequilibrium (
1t

 ), from the M-TAR model one can check 





According to Enders & Granger (1998) and Enders & Siklos (2001), using the 
TAR or M-TAR models, two tests can be conducted; testing for threshold 
cointegration and testing for asymmetric adjustment in the long-run equilibrium. 
Testing for threshold cointegration involves testing the following null 
hypothesis of no threshold cointegration: 
1 2
0 : 0H     
The test statistic used here is known as the  statistic and the critical values are 
from Enders & Siklos (2001). If the null hypothesis is rejected, the presence of 
threshold cointegration is confirmed and we can then test whether the adjustment is 
asymmetric. 
Testing for asymmetric adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium involves 
testing the following null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment: 
1 2
0 :H   . If the hypothesis is rejected, the adjustment process is asymmetric. 
The study uses monthly data on real government spending, real tax revenue and 
real grants for Burundi covering the period 1997:1–2013:5. Data for these variables 
were collected from various monthly reports from the Central Bank of Burundi. 
Figure 1 shows the trend of these variables for the period of study. 
 
 
Figure 1. Trend of Government Spending, Taxes and Grants in Burundi (Billions of BIF, in 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 Since high frequency data (monthly data) is used in this study, it is advised to 
test for seasonality in the series prior to any detailed analysis. The results are 
reported in Table 2. All the tests used, namely, F-test, nonparametric test and 
moving seasonality test, indeed reject the null hypothesis of no seasonality in the 
data, although no moving seasonality could be found for real government spending 
(G) and real tax revenue (R) at the 5% level. Since the tests results give evidence of 
the presence of seasonality in the data, data were deseasonalized. Seasonally 
adjusted variables are therefore considered for the rest of the analysis. 
 
Table 2. Results of Seasonality Tests 
Variables F-test Nonparametric Test (Kruskal-Wallis Test) Moving Seasonality Test 
G 4.519*** 40.36*** 0.985 
R 5.844*** 86.23*** 1.635 
GR 2.726** 23.85** 6.448*** 
Note: Seasonality tests are conducted using X-12 ARIMA installed in Eviews 8. ** and *** denote rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no seasonality at 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
The order of integration of the series is examined using a unit root test with one 
regime shift proposed by Lanne, Saikkonen & Lutkepohl (2003), denoted hereafter 
as LSL test, and a stationarity test, KPSS test. These tests are conducted on 
seasonally adjusted series. The results reported in Table 3 indicate that the LSL test 
detects the break in March 2007, August 2008 and December 2007 respectively for 
government spending, tax and grants. After taking into account the break, the LSL 
test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the series, real government 
spending, real tax revenue and real grants (all transformed in logarithm). However, 
when differenced once, the same test strongly rejects the presence of a unit root at 
the 1% level.  
 
Table 3. KPSS Test and Lanne et al. (2003) Unit Root Test with One Structural Break 
 LSL Unit Root Test with one Break KPSS Stationarity test 
Variables Lag Deterministic Part Break Dates LSL Value KPSS value Bandwidth 
G  11 C, SD 2007 M3 -2.084 1.691*** 10 
G  10 C, SD -5.267*** 0.369 101 
R  9 C, ID 2008 M8 -1.403 1.774*** 10 
R  8 C, ID -7.095*** 0.085 26 
GR  0 C, SD 2007 M12 -2.213 1.134* 5 
GR  12 C, ID -7.073*** 0.142 45 
Notes: JMulTi software (version 4.23) is used to perform the Lanne et al. (2003) Unit Root Test. LSL stands for 
Lanne, Saikkonen & Lutkepohl (2003) test.   is the difference operator. C is the constant, SD stands for shift 
dummy and ID is the impulse dummy. The lag length is selected using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). For 
L.S test, break dates are selected automatically by the software. * and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis 
at 10% and 1% level respectively. Critical values are from Lanne et al. 2002): C.V (1%) = -3.48, C.V (5%) = -2.88 
and C.V (10%) = -2.58. KPSS test is conducted using Eviews 8 and the critical values are C.V (1%) = 0.739, C.V 
(5%) = 0.463 and C.V (10%) = 0.347.  For KPSS test, the bandwidth is selected automatically using Bartlett 
Kernel method. 
 
In addition, the results indicate that the KPSS test rejects the null hypothesis of 
stationarity in the series at the 1% level for real government spending and real tax 
revenue, and at the 10% level for real grants, but fails to reject the stationarity of 
the variables for the first difference of all the variables. The LSL and KPSS tests 
therefore suggest that the variables used in this study, real government spending, 
real tax revenue and real grants, are non-stationary processes, integrated of order 
one, denoted I(1). 
Since the series, real government spending, real tax revenue and real grants are 
found to be non-stationary, integrated of the same order, one, the cointegration 
relationship among them is tested. A nonlinear cointegration test, the threshold 
cointegration test initiated by Enders & Siklos (2001) is used, a test which allows 
for asymmetries in the adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium. An R 
software package, “apt” package (version 2.4) developed by Sun (2015) is used to 
conduct the threshold cointegration. The threshold cointegration test results are 
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presented in Table 4. The threshold value is estimated for both TAR and M-TAR 
using Chan’s (1993) method. The threshold value for which the residuals sum of 
squares is the lowest was found to be * 0.284   for the TAR model and * 0.334  
for the M-TAR. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is used to select the 
appropriate lag k  to include in the TAR and M-TAR models. Out of a maximum 
of 12 lags, a lag of 2 was selected for both TAR and M-TAR models. The Ljung-
Box (LB) test fails to reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation of order 4, 8 and 
12 for all the models.  
The estimated TAR model can be written as follows, where the t-values are in 
parentheses: 
 
1 1 1 20.403 0.559 (1 ) 0.460 0.177
( 3.640) ( 4.500) ( 5.045) ( 2.523)
t t t t tt t t
I I                 
   


























and for the M-TAR, the estimated model is written as: 
 
1 1 1 20.397 0.683 (1 ) 0.433 0.175
( 3.916) ( 4.731) ( 4.728) ( 2.517)
t t t t tt t t
I I                 
   


























The threshold value   and the selected lag length were taken into account to 
test for threshold cointegration among real government spending, real tax revenue 
and real grants. The results reported in Table 3 indicate that the   test strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration, 
1 2
( 0 : 0)H     at the 1% 
level for both the models, since * 12.587   with a p-value of 0.000 for TAR model 
and * 14.050    with a p-value of 0.000 for M-TAR. Thus, the results suggest that 
in Burundi, real government spending, real tax revenue and real grants are 
cointegrated with threshold adjustment.  
Since the hypothesis of no threshold cointegration among the variables is 
rejected, the study proceeds to test whether the adjustment towards the long-run 
equilibrium is asymmetric. The F-test is used to test whether 
1 2
  from TAR and 
M-TAR equations. The results indicate that the value of the F-statistic is F = 1.347 
with a p-value of 0.247 for the TAR model, and 3.949F   with a p-value of 0.048 
for the M-TAR model. This suggests that the null hypothesis of symmetric 
adjustment
1 2












Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(1), A. Ndoricimpa, p.53-70. 
62 
62 
Table 4. Test Results for Threshold Cointegration and Symmetry 
 Model 
Estimates TAR M-TAR 
Threshold   -0.284 -0.334 
1









Diagnostic tests   
AIC 54.458 51.838 
BIC 70.797 68.177 
LB(4) 0.906 0.858 
LB(8) 0.162 0.226 
LB(12) 0.157 0.204 
Hypothesis Testing   
H0: No Cointegration 
1 2












Cointegrating Equation based on OLS 
2.991 0.712 0.039
(5.256) (11.672) (2.787)
t t t t
G R GR      
Cointegrating Equation based on Dynamic OLS 
1.783 0.830 0.050
(9.610) (2.305) (2.232)
t t t t
G R GR      
Notes: Below the estimated coefficients (or the test statistic values) and between parentheses (.) are 
the p-values and ** and *** denote rejection of the null of hypothesis respectively at 5% and 1% 
level. Between brackets [.] are t-values. The values reported for Ljung-Box (LB) test are p-values. 
AIC stands for Akaike Information Criterion while BIC stands for Bayesian Information Criterion. 
 
The adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is asymmetric only for the M-
TAR model. The results from the M-TAR model suggest, therefore, that real 
government spending, real tax revenue and real grants are cointegrated and that the 
adjustment mechanism is asymmetric, that is, real government spending, real tax 
revenue and real grants respond differently to positive and negative deviations 
from the long-run equilibrium. Moreover, for both models, the results show that
1 2
  , indicating that the adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium tends to 
persist more for positive deviations and reverts more quickly for negative 
deviations. According to Saunoris & Payne (2010), this would mean that the 
adjustment is faster when the budget is worsening than when it is improving. 
The finding that real government spending, real tax revenue and real grants are 
cointegrated with asymmetric adjustment, justifies the estimation of an asymmetric 
error correction model. It is to be noted that in the estimation of asymmetric error 
correction model and for subsequent analysis, only M-TAR model is considered 
since for TAR model, the adjustment was found to be symmetric instead of 
asymmetric. Moreover, Table 4 shows that M-TAR model is better than TAR 
model since the values of AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and BIC (Bayesian 
Information Criterion) are lower for the M-TAR model than TAR model. 
Following Chang et al. (2011) and Lu et al. (2011), the following asymmetric error 
correction model (AECM) is estimated for our three variables, real government 
spending (
tG ), real tax revenue ( tR ) and real grants ( tGR ), in order to examine the 
causal links between them in the short and the long run: 
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   are positive and negative deviations from 




are the lagged residuals from Equation 1, that is, 
1 1 1 1t t t t
G R GR   
   
    .   and  show how real government spending, real 
taxes and real grants respond asymmetrically to positive and negative deviations 
from the long-run equilibrium, respectively. More precisely,   shows how tax and 
spending respond to an improving budget while   indicates how tax and spending 
respond to a worsening budget. 
 From Equations 6, 7 and 8, the following hypotheses are tested: 
(i) Whether government taxes Granger cause government spending: 
1 20: ... 0g g gpH        
(ii) Whether government spending Granger-cause government taxes:
 
1 20: ... 0r r rpH        
(iii) Whether grants affect government spending: 
1 20: ... 0g g gpH        
(iv) Whether grants affect government taxes: 
1 20: ... 0r r rpH         
From Equations 6, 7 and 8, therefore, one can check which hypothesis is valid 
for Burundi, whether it’s the tax-and-spend hypothesis, spend-and-tax hypothesis, 
fiscal synchronization hypothesis or institutional separation hypothesis, as well as 
how external grants affect government spending and taxes, and how taxes and 
spending respond to the budgetary disequilibrium. The estimation results of the 
AECM are reported in Table 5.  
The AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and FPE (Final Prediction Error) were 
used to select the lag p to include in the equations and out of 12 lags; AIC and FPE 
selected 9 lags. Diagnostic tests show that the Breusch-Godfrey test fails to reject 
the hypothesis of no serial correlation of order 2, 4 and 6 for all the equations. 
From Table 4, the results of estimation for the AECM for the three variables can be 
written in the form of equations as follows, with t-statistics in parentheses and 
between brackets is the p-value for the F-statistics (denoted PF) for the null 






0.028 0.125 0.330 (1 )
         (1.607)   (-1.294)      (-2.094)                [ 0.00]   [ 0.82]  [ 0.01]
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          ( 0.634)  ( 0.064)     ( 1.899)                [ 0.77]   [ 0.58]  [ 0.00]








   




where 1t  is derived from the cointegrating equation
2.991 0.712 0.039
t t t t
G R GR      and the Heaviside indicator tI is such that 
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Table 5. Results of Asymmetric Error Correction Model with Threshold Cointegration 
   Spending Equation     Tax Equation     Grant Equation 
Coefficients Estimates t-ratio Estimates t-ratio Estimates t-ratio 
c  0.028 1.607 0.022 1.529 -0.076 -0.634 
   -0.125 -1.294 0.043 0.525 -0.043 -0.064 
   -0.330** -2.094 0.132 0.986 -2.074* -1.899 
1
  -0.804*** -7.010 0.042 0.438 1.076 1.354 
2
  -0.672*** -5.149 0.055 0.495 0.465 0.515 
3
  -0.672*** -4.865 -0.049 -0.424 -0.026 -0.027 
4
  -0.664*** -4.687 -0.050 -0.415 0.189 0.193 
5
  -0.603*** -4.405 -0.032 -0.282 0.198 0.209 
6
  -0.427*** -3.243 0.047 0.426 0.606 0.664 
7
  -0.231* -1.913 -0.072 -0.709 0.376 0.450 
8
  -0.133 -1.256 -0.034 -0.388 -0.258 -0.352 
9
  -0.087 -1.131 0.013 0.199 0.223 0.415 
1
  0.034 0.275 -0.705*** -6.683 -0.720 -0.838 
2
  -0.025 -0.178 -0.589*** -4.884 -0.286 -0.291 
3
  -0.145 -0.965 -0.494*** -3.868 0.589 0.566 
4
  -0.230 -1.504 -0.340*** -2.612 0.789 0.743 
5
  -0.210 -1.407 -0.258** -2.030 0.609 0.588 
6
  -0.214 -1.478 -0.180 -1.460 0.707 0.704 
7
  -0.133 -1.004 -0.149 -1.323 0.658 0.715 
8
  -0.096 -0.837 -0.158 -1.614 0.258 0.324 
9
  -0.089 -1.053 -0.063 -0.878 0.325 0.555 
1
  0.014 1.144 0.014 1.401 -0.575*** -6.819 
2
  0.019 1.365 0.002 0.237 -0.478*** -4.932 
3
  0.017 1.188 -0.006 -0.537 -0.545*** -5.338 
4
  0.037** 2.360 -0.003 -0.216 -0.429*** -3.938 
5
  0.031* 1.945 -0.007 -0.511 -0.427*** -3.846 
6
  -0.005 -0.331 -0.013 -0.947 -0.372*** -3.359 
7
  0.009 0.653 -0.008 -0.685 -0.230** -2.243 
8
  -0.001 -0.076 0.025** 2.193 -0.183* -1.911 
9
  -0.029** -2.260 -0.034*** -3.176 -0.093 -1.049 
2R  0.57  0.60  0.32  
AIC -0.077  -0.402  3.791  
SC 0.440  0.116  4.310  
BG(2) 0.844 [0.655] 0.590 [0.744] 3.743 [0.153] 
BG(4) 3.061 [0.547] 2.709 [0.607] 9.904 [0.042] 
BG(6) 8.550 [0.200] 4.074 [0.666] 10.740 [0.096] 
Notes: A lag length of 9 was used, selected by AIC out of a maximum of 12 lags; between brackets [.] 
are the p-values and *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis respectively at 10%, 5% and 
1% level. Between {.} is the sign of the sum of the causal coefficients. BG stands for Breusch-
Godfrey serial correlation test. 
 
The Granger causality test results from the estimated AECM reported in Table 6 
suggest that in the short run, real government taxes do not Granger-cause real 
government spending since 2 (9) 5.093  with a p-value of 0.826 and real 
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government spending does not Granger-cause real government taxes since
2
(9) 7.474   with a p-value of 0.587. This implies that an independence 
relationship exists between real government spending and real taxes in Burundi. 
The Wald test of Granger non-causality shows that in both spending and tax 
equations, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the lagged difference of 
grants are equal to 0,
 1 20 : ... 0pH      
 is rejected at the 5% 
2
(9) 20.545, 0.014p      and 1% level
2
(9) 39.325, 0.000p     , respectively. This 
indicates that real grants Granger-cause both real government spending and real tax 
revenue at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The sign of the causal coefficients is 
found to be positive for the government spending equation and negative for the tax 
revenue equation. This suggests that an increase in grants leads to an increase in 
government spending but to a decrease in tax revenue in Burundi. This implies that 
grants encourage the government of Burundi to spend more, but discourage tax 
revenue collection. It should be noted that the F-statistic as reported in the AECM 
equations gives the same conclusion. 
 
Table 6. Causality Tests Results from Estimated Asymmetric Error Correction Model 





R  tGR  
H0: No short-run causality    
2
1
( 0 : ... 0)
p






( 0 : ... 0)
p
H      5.093 {-} 
[0.826] 




( 0 : ... 0)
p





Error Correction Terms    












Notes: Between brackets [.] are the p-values. Between parentheses (.) are the t-ratios. ** and *** 
denote rejection of the null of hypothesis respectively at 5% and 1% level. Between {.} is the sign of 
the sum of the causal coefficients. 
 
The findings here support the claims of Gupta et al. (2004) and Morrissey 
(2012) and others, who argued that grants could actually crowd out tax revenue, 
supporting the tax displacement hypothesis. The findings also justify why the 
budget deficits persist in grant-dependent countries such as Burundi since grants 
seem to encourage government spending but discourage tax collection. Lastly, 
Granger causality tests results indicate that the Wald test fails to reject the null 
hypotheses that government spending does not Granger-cause grants and that tax 
revenue does not Granger-cause grants. This suggests that both government 
spending and taxes do not affect grants, which would imply that grants in Burundi 
are independent of the fiscal behaviour. It follows that the way in which the 
government of Burundi spends and taxes does not affect the donors’ behaviour. 
The estimation results further show that the coefficient of the error correction term 
is statistically significant in the spending equation at the five-per-cent level and for 
negative deviations only. However, for the tax revenue equation, the coefficients of 
the error correction terms are statistically insignificant for both negative and 
positive deviations. This suggests that only spending responds to budgetary 
disequilibrium, and only when the budget is worsening. They adjust to the 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium if 1 0.334t    . 
This finding implies that when the budget situation is worsening, to restore the 
equilibrium the adjustment is made by changing government spending but not 
taxes; specifically by reducing spending since the coefficient of   is significantly 
negative.  
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 The aim of this study was to examine asymmetries in the tax-spending nexus in 
Burundi using monthly data for the period 1997:1–2013:5. Since Burundi is a 
grant-dependent country, grants were included in the model. The paper employed 
TAR and M-TAR models to test for threshold cointegration, as advanced by 
Enders & Siklos (2001), between government spending, tax revenue and grants. 
The results support the presence of threshold cointegration with asymmetric 
adjustment. Causality tests from the estimated asymmetric error correction model 
suggest that in the short run there is an independence relationship between 
government spending and taxes in Burundi. In addition, the findings suggest that 
grants encourage the government of Burundi to spend more but discourage tax 
revenue; the latter case is the tax displacement hypothesis. The independence 
relationship between spending and taxes is probably due to the role grants play in 
the Burundian fiscal behaviour. However, the results suggest that while grants 
affect the fiscal behaviour in Burundi, they are independent of it. Furthermore, the 
findings indicate that only government spending responds to the budgetary 
disequilibrium and only when the budget situation is worsening. This finding 
shows that in Burundi, to restore the equilibrium when the budget situation is 
worsening, the adjustment is made by reducing spending. A policy intuition arising 
from this study is that, to reduce the budget deficits, Burundi should reduce its 
grant-dependency and improve its tax collection system as well as cut its spending 
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1 Data from Regional Economic Outlook, Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, 2012) 
2 According to the convergence criterion for fiscal balance for COMESA and EAC, the budget deficit 
ratio should not exceed 2% when including grants and 5% when excluding grants (Zhang, 2012). 
3 On the tax-and-spend hypothesis, Friedman (1978) suggests that an increase in taxes is associated 
with an increase in government spending while for Buchanan & Wagner (1978), an increase 
(decrease) in taxes is associated with a decrease (increase) in government spending. The spend-and-
tax hypothesis suggests that an increase (decrease) in government spending is associated with an 
increase (decrease) in taxes (Barro, 1986). Fiscal synchronization hypothesis suggests that the 
desired level of government spending and government taxes is chosen simultaneously by the 
government. In other words, decisions to spend and to tax are made simultaneously (Musgrave, 
1966) and Meltzer & Richard, 1981). The institutional separation hypothesis suggests an 
independent relationship between government taxes and spending (Baghestani & McNown, 1994). 
4 A number of studies such as Heller & Gupta (2002), Gupta et al. (2003), Morrissey (2012) and 
Benedek et al. (2012) explore the impact of grants on the recipient’s tax revenue. According to 
them, the impact of external aid on tax revenue can be positive or negative depending on the form it 
takes, whether they are in the form of loans with repayment obligations, or pure grants with no 
repayment obligations. Loans are likely to strengthen the tax system and encourage tax revenue 
because of repayment obligations, while pure grants are likely to lead to a reduction in the 
recipient’s tax revenue by lowering the government’s incentive to increase the tax effort (Martins, 
2007) or by undermining the development of domestic institutions (Benedek et al., 2012). As 
Morrissey (2012) points out, this negative effect on tax revenue occurs particularly in the case of 
pure grants for which there is no repayment obligation. Grants in this case do not add to domestic 
resources but act as a substitute for tax revenue (Martins, 2007). The negative impact of grants on 
tax revenue is called the “tax displacement hypothesis”. Concerning the impact of grants on 
government spending, Gramlich (1969) claims that an increase in grants leads to a more than 
proportional increase in government spending, that is, “a $1 increase in aid leads to more than one 
dollar increase in government spending” (Tarekegn, 2002). 
5 Data from Central Bank of Burundi (BRB), Annual Report (2008, 2013) 
6 Central Bank of Burundi, Annual Report, 2000 
7 Central Bank of Burundi, Annual Report, 2001 
8 Central Bank of Burundi, Annual Report, 2005 
9 Central Bank of Burundi, Annual Report, 2011 
10 Balke & Fomby (1997) use an example of “fixed costs of adjustment” to explain how adjustment 
can be asymmetric for many economic phenomena in general. They point out that the presence of 
fixed costs of adjustment may prevent economic agents from adjusting continuously. According to 
them, it is only when the deviation from the equilibrium exceeds a critical threshold that the 
benefits of adjustment exceed the costs and, hence, economic agents act to move the system back 
towards the equilibrium. 
11 Government spending (G) is endogenised since it makes sense to assume a priori that spending 
depends on tax and grants. In addition, G is endogenised following other studies on asymmetries in 
spend-tax nexus (see for instance Keho, 2013). 
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